Kargil War

The Kargil War, also known as the Kargil conflict, was fought between India and Pakistan from May to July 1999 in the Kargil district of Ladakh, then part of the Indian-administered state of Jammu and Kashmir and along the Line of Control (LoC). The conflict is also referred to as Operation Vijay, which was the codename of the Indian military operation in the region in India. The Indian Air Force acted jointly with the Indian Army to flush out the Pakistan Army and paramilitary troops from vacated Indian positions along the LoC, in what was designated as Operation Safed Sagar.

Overview§

The Kargil War, also known as the Kargil conflict, was fought between India and Pakistan from May to July 1999 in the Kargil district of Ladakh, then part of the Indian-administered state of Jammu and Kashmir and along the Line of Control (LoC). The conflict is also referred to as Operation Vijay (lit. 'Victory'), which was the codename of the Indian military operation in the region in India. The Indian Air Force acted jointly with the Indian Army to flush out the Pakistan Army and paramilitary troops from vacated Indian positions along the LoC, in what was designated as Operation Safed Sagar (lit. 'White Sea'). The conflict was triggered by the infiltration of Pakistani troops—disguised as Kashmiri militants—into strategic positions on the Indian side of the LoC, which acts as the de facto border between the two countries in the disputed region of Kashmir. During its initial stages, Pakistan blamed the fighting entirely on independent Kashmiri insurgents, but documents left behind by casualties and later statements by Pakistan's Prime Minister and Chief of Army Staff showed the involvement of Pakistani paramilitary forces, led by General Ashraf Rashid. The Indian Army, later supported by the Indian Air Force, recaptured a majority of the positions on the Indian side of the LoC; facing international diplomatic opposition, Pakistani forces withdrew from all remaining Indian positions along the LoC. The Kargil War is the most recent example of high-altitude warfare in mountainous terrain, and as such, posed substantial logistical problems for the combatting sides. It also marks one of only two instances of conventional warfare between nuclear-armed states (alongside the Sino-Soviet border conflict). India had conducted its first successful test in 1974; Pakistan, which was developing its nuclear capability in secret since around the same time, conducted its first known tests in 1998, just two weeks after a second series of tests by India.

Location§

Before the Partition of India in 1947, Kargil was a tehsil (subdistrict) of Ladakh, a sparsely populated region with diverse linguistic, ethnic and religious groups, living in isolated valleys separated by some of the world's highest mountains. The Indo-Pakistani War of 1947-1948 concluded with the Line of Control bisecting Ladakh district, with Skardu tehsil going to Pakistan (now part of Gilgit-Baltistan). After Pakistan's defeat in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, the two nations signed the Simla Agreement promising not to engage in armed conflict with respect to that boundary. The town of Kargil is located 205 km (127 mi) from Srinagar, facing the Northern Areas across the LOC. Like other areas in the Himalayas, Kargil has a continental climate. Summers are cool with frigid nights, while winters are long and chilly with temperatures often dropping to −48 °C (−54 °F). An Indian national highway (NH 1) connecting Srinagar to Leh cuts through Kargil. The military outposts on the ridges above the highway were generally around 5,000 m (16,000 ft) high, with a few as high as 5,485 m (17,995 ft). The rough terrain and narrow roads slowed down traffic, and the high altitude, which affected the ability of aircraft to carry loads, made control of NH 1 (the actual stretch of the highway which was under Pakistani fire) a priority for India. From their 130+ covertly occupied observation posts, the occupants had a clear line-of-sight. Kargil was targeted partly because the terrain was conducive to the preemptive seizure of several unoccupied military positions. With tactically vital features and well-prepared defensive posts atop the peaks, a defender on the high ground would enjoy advantages akin to that of a fortress. Any attack to dislodge a defender from high ground in mountain warfare requires a far higher ratio of attackers to defenders, and the difficulties would be exacerbated by the high altitude and freezing temperatures. Kargil is just 173 km (107 mi) from the Pakistani-controlled town of Skardu, which was capable of providing logistical and artillery support to Pakistani combatants. A road between Kargil and Skardu exists, which was closed in 1949.

Background§

After the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971, there was a long period with relatively few direct armed conflicts involving the military forces of the two neighbours—notwithstanding the efforts of both nations to control the Siachen Glacier by establishing military outposts on the surrounding mountains ridges and the resulting military skirmishes in the 1980s. Though, escalating tensions and conflict due to separatist activities in Kashmir, some of which were supported by Pakistan, along with the conducting of nuclear tests by both countries in 1998, led to an increasingly belligerent atmosphere during the 1990s. In an attempt to defuse the situation, both countries signed the Lahore Declaration in February 1999, promising to provide a peaceful and bilateral solution to the Kashmir conflict. Some elements of the Pakistani Armed Forces were covertly training and sending Pakistani troops and paramilitary forces, some allegedly in the guise of mujahideen, into territory on the Indian side of the LOC during the winter of 1998–1999. The infiltration was codenamed "Operation Badr"; its aim was to sever the link between Kashmir and Ladakh, and cause Indian forces to withdraw from the Siachen Glacier, accordingly forcing India to negotiate a settlement of the broader Kashmir dispute. Pakistan also believed any tension in the region would internationalise the Kashmir issue, helping it to secure a speedy resolution. Yet another goal may have been to boost the morale of the decade-long rebellion in Jammu and Kashmir by taking a proactive role. Pakistani Lieutenant General Shahid Aziz, and then head of ISI analysis wing, has confirmed there were no mujahideen but only regular Pakistan Army soldiers who took part in the Kargil War. "There were no Mujahideen, only taped wireless messages, which fooled no one. Our soldiers were made to occupy barren ridges, with hand held weapons and ammunition", Lt Gen Aziz wrote in his article in The Nation daily in January 2013. Some writers have speculated the operation's objective may also have been retaliation for India's Operation Meghdoot in 1984 that seized much of Siachen Glacier. According to India's then army chief (COAS) Ved Prakash Malik, and many scholars, much of the background planning, including construction of logistical supply routes, was undertaken much earlier. On several occasions during the 1980s and 1990s, the army had given Pakistani leaders (Zia ul Haq and Benazir Bhutto) similar proposals for infiltration into the Kargil region, but these plans were shelved for fear of drawing the nations into all-out war. Some analysts believe the blueprint of attack was reactivated soon after Pervez Musharraf was appointed chief of army staff in October 1998. After the war, Nawaz Sharif, Prime Minister of Pakistan during the Kargil conflict, claimed he was unaware of the plans and he first learned around the situation when he gained an urgent phone call from Atal Bihari Vajpayee, his counterpart in India. Sharif attributed the plan to Musharraf and "just two or three of his cronies", a view shared by some Pakistani writers who have stated only four generals, including Musharraf, knew of the plan. Musharraf, though, asserted that Sharif was briefed on the Kargil operation 15 days ahead of Vajpayee's journey to Lahore on 20 February. Analysts highlighted Vajpayee’s leadership during the conflict as balancing military firmness with diplomatic restraint, contributing to India’s ability to maintain international support while defending its territorial integrity.

Occupation by Pakistan§

During February 1999, the Pakistan Army sent forces to occupy some posts on the Indian side of the LOC. Troops from the elite Special Services Group along with four to seven battalions of the Northern Light Infantry (a paramilitary regiment not part of the regular Pakistani army at that time) covertly and overtly set up bases on 132 vantage points of the Indian-controlled region. According to some reports, these Pakistani forces were backed by Kashmiri guerrillas and Afghan mercenaries. According to General Ved Malik, the bulk of the infiltration occurred in April. Pakistani intrusions took place in the heights of the lower Mushkoh Valley, along the Marpo La ridgeline in Drass, in Kaksar near Kargil, in the Batalik sector east of the Indus River, on the heights above the Chorbat La sector where the LOC turns North and in the Turtuk sector south of the Siachen area.

Discovery of infiltration and mobilisation§

Initially, these incursions were not detected for several reasons: Indian patrols were not sent into some of the areas infiltrated by the Pakistani forces and heavy artillery fire by Pakistan in some areas provided cover for the infiltrators. But by the second week of May, the ambush of an Indian patrol team led by Captain Saurabh Kalia, who acted on a tip-off by a local shepherd in the Batalik sector, led to the exposure of the infiltration. Initially, with little knowledge of the nature or extent of the infiltration, the Indian troops in the area assumed the infiltrators were jihadis and claimed they would evict them within a few days. At the time of the discovery of these attacks, the COAS of the Indian Army Gen V. P. Malik was on a visit to Poland and was receiving information regarding the discoveries. On 12 May, the estimate reported by the DGMO to Gen Malik was "some militants" but by 15 May, the estimate had risen to 250-300. 8 Mountain Division under the command of Maj. Gen. Mohinder Puri was mobilised to be ready for engagement. The estimate grew to over 1000 by 21 May. The true scale of the incursions was only recognised by the high command after the CCS meeting on 18 May after which heavy mobilisation started and division level movement was ordered. Several divisions were ordered to halt counterinsurgency activities and position to engage the infiltrators. The total area seized by the ingress is generally accepted to between 130 and 200 km2 (50 and 80 sq mi). The clear line of sight provided by the ridges was a serious problem for the Indian Army as the highway was the main logistical and supply route. The Pakistani shelling of the arterial road threatened to cut Leh off, though an alternative (and longer) road to Leh existed via Himachal Pradesh, the Leh–Manali Highway. The infiltrators, apart from being equipped with small arms and grenade launchers, were also armed with mortars, artillery and anti-aircraft guns. Many posts were also heavily mined, with India later stating it recovered more than 8,000 anti-personnel mines, according to an ICBL report. Pakistan's reconnaissance was done through unmanned aerial vehicles and AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder radars supplied by the US.

The Government of India responded with Operation Vijay, a mobilisation of 200,000 Indian troops. Because of the nature of the terrain, division and corps operations could not be mounted; subsequent fighting was conducted mostly at the brigade or battalion level, though. In effect, two divisions of the Indian Army, numbering 20,000, plus several thousand from the Paramilitary forces of India and the air force were deployed in the conflict zone. The total number of Indian soldiers involved in the military operation in the Kargil-Drass sector was accordingly close to 30,000. The number of infiltrators, including those providing logistical backup, has since been put at around 5,000 at the height of the conflict. The Indian Air Force launched Operation Safed Sagar in support of the mobilisation of Indian land forces on 26 May. The Indian government cleared limited use of Air Power only on 25 May, for fear of undesirable escalation, with the fiat that IAF fighter jets were not to cross the LOC under any circumstance. This was the first time any air war was fought at such high altitudes globally, with targets at altitudes between 1,800 to 5,500 metres (6,000 to 18,000 ft) above sea level. The rarified air at these altitudes affected the ballistic trajectories of air to ground weapons such as rockets, along with dumb and laser guided bombs. There was no opposition at all by the Pakistani Air Force, leaving the IAF free to carry out its attacks with impunity. The total air dominance of the IAF gave the aircrew enough time to modify aiming indices and firing techniques, increasing its effectiveness during the high altitude war. Poor weather conditions and range limitations intermittently affected bomb loads and the number of airstrips that could be used, except for the Mirage 2000 fleet, which commenced operations on 30 May.

Naval action§

The Indian Navy also prepared to blockade Pakistani ports, mainly Karachi port, to cut off supply routes under Operation Talwar. The operation's goal was to choke Pakistani trade channels and damage its oil imports. The mission started when the frigate INS Taragiri and the missile corvettes INS Veer and INS Nirghat were first deployed near the Dwaraka coast, along with Dornier 228 maritime patrol aircraft. The Indian Navy's western and eastern fleets joined in the North Arabian Sea on 25th May and started aggressive patrols. Rajput and Delhi class Destroyers were deployed near Saurashtra. Indian amphibious warfare ships were also deployed, when they intercepted a North Korean merchantman carrying weapons to Pakistan by 30th June. This exploited Pakistan's dependence on sea-based oil and trade flows. The Indian flotilla also conducted naval drills in the Arabian Sea. The Western fleet moved into strike positions and the submarine fleet of the Indian Navy was deployed around Karachi. Later, then–Prime Minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif disclosed Pakistan was left with just six days of fuel to sustain itself if a full-scale war had broken out.

Mushkoh valley sector§

The task of repelling the Pakistani forces was given to the 15th Corps under the command of Lt. Gen. Kishan Pal. Before the commencement of the engagement, was mainly enforced by 121 (I) infantry Brigade commanded by Brig, the Kargil area. Surinder Singh, but Brig. Singh was dismissed from his position when the infiltration was discovered. In his place, Brig. O. P. Nandrajog took command of the brigade. 56 Mountain Brigade under the command of Brig. A. N. Aul of the 8 Mountain Division was also inducted into the area.

Battle of Tololing§

The Indian Army's first priority was to recapture peaks that were in the immediate vicinity of NH 1. This resulted in Indian troops first targeting the Tiger Hill and Tololing complex in Dras, which dominated the Srinagar-Leh route. The Battle of Tololing, amongst other assaults, slowly tilted the combat in India's favour. 18 Grenadiers, 1 Naga and Garhwal Regiments under the command of Col Kushal Thakur had begun an assault on Tololing and were awaiting reinforcements by 22 May. The battle lasted till 14 June. Along with reinforcements from 2 Rajputana Rifles under Lt Col M. B. Ravindranath and 16 Grenadiers, the Indian forces had to carry out several assaults in difficult terrain. Several senior Indian army officers were killed in action but Tololing peak and surrounding points like Point 4590 were captured. The recapture of Point 4590 on Tololing by Indian troops on 14 June was substantial, notwithstanding the fact that it resulted in the Indian Army suffering the most casualties in a single battle during the conflict.

Operation Safed Sagar§

The Indian Air Force was tasked to act jointly with ground troops on 25 May. The code name assigned to their role was Operation Safed Sagar. It was in this type of terrain that aerial attacks were used, initially with limited effectiveness. On 27 May, the IAF lost a MiG-27 aircraft piloted by Flt. Lt. K Nachiketa, which it attributed to an engine failure, and a MiG-21 fighter piloted by Sqn Ldr Ajay Ahuja which was shot down by the Pakistani army, both over the Batalik sector. Initially Pakistan said it shot down both jets after they crossed into its territory. According to reports, Ahuja had bailed out of his stricken plane safely but was apparently killed by his captors as his body was returned riddled with bullet wounds. One Indian Mi-8 helicopter was also lost due to Stinger SAMs. French made Mirage 2000H of the IAF were tasked to drop laser-guided bombs to destroy well-entrenched positions of the Pakistani forces and flew its first sortie on 30 May. The effects of the pinpoint non-stop bombing by the Mirage-2000, at day and night, became evident with almost immediate effect. India had mobilised a huge portion of its army near the international border and Indian commanders were on order to be ready for crossing the International border by 15 June. The Pakistani DGMO Tauqir Zia communicated to the Indian DGMO Nirmal Chander Vij that Pakistan was uncomfortable with the escalations. According to then COAS of India VP Malik, Pakistan did not want to escalate further.

Capture of point 5140§

On 17 June, 13 J&K Rifles was tasked with capturing points 5140. Under the command of Lt Col YK Joshi, the battalion carried the operation out on 20 June and successfully captured the point after an intense close-quarters battle. Gen Malik called Lt Vikram Batra's for his contribution to the battle, and his success signal - "Yeh Dil mange More" became legendary. Areas adjacent to point 5140, namely Rocky Knob and Black Tooth, were captured by 1 Naga by 22 June. The infiltrators evicted from 5140 and Tololing had regrouped at point 4700 and 18 Grenadiers were tasked with removing them. This attack was successfully carried out from 28 to 30 June. This attack enabled the Indian forces to finally focus on point 5100 and Area three pimples.

Capture of Three Pimples§

As the operation was fully underway, around 250 artillery guns were brought in to clear the infiltrators in the posts that were in the line-of-sight. The Bofors FH-77B field howitzer played a vital role, with Indian gunners making maximum use of the terrain. Though, its success was limited elsewhere due to the lack of space and depth to deploy it. Area three pimples consisted of the Knoll, Lone Hill and Three Pimples. 2 Rajputana Rifles of Lt. Col. Ravindranath was tasked to recapture it on 28 June. Gen Malik personally talked with Ravindranath before the battle. The battle started 2 hours later and lasted for 2 days. Area three pimples was captured on 29 June.

Battle of Tiger Hill§

By the last week of June, most Pakistani fire power was concentrated to the highest peak in the surrounding, Tiger Hill. The 18 Grenadiers were placed under 192 Mountain Brigade commanded by Brig. MPS Bajwa and 41 Field Regiment was given the primary responsibility of artillery operations. The air force also concentrated its strikes on Tiger hill. This was the first battle in India to be telecasted live. The Battle of Tiger Hill started on 3 July. After 2 days of intense warfare, it was deemed impossible to just conclude the attack with one battalion so 8 Sikh was ordered to move from the west into Tiger Hill. Several objectives were completed and leading Pakistani commanders were killed by 5 July. By 8 July the entire Tiger Hill feature was captured by 18 Grenadiers and 8 Sikh and Gen VP Malik addressed the media informing the world. Two months into the conflict, Indian troops had slowly retaken most of the ridges encroached upon by the infiltrators; according to the official count, an estimated 75–80% of the intruded area and nearly all the high ground were back under Indian control.

Battle of point 4875§

After the battle of Tiger Hill, the next important objective was to capture point 4875 North-West of Mashkoh. The 13 JnK Rifles was assigned to 79 Mountain brigade of Brig. Ramesh Kakar. Lt. Col. Joshi regrouped in Mashkoh Valley on 1 July and the Battle started on 4 July. After hours of intense battle, Lt. Col. Joshi was unable to capture the point due to the fortification disadvantage and two companies of the battalion found themselves stuck in daylight. An injured Lt. Vikram Batra volunteered to reinforce the companies and was deployed as a platoon commander. Throughout the night 5 July, the battle raged in close-quatres. "The opposing troops were so close that, besides the staccato of small arms, verbal exchanges carried on throughout the night", noted Gen. Malik. While assaulting the peak, Capt. Naveen Nagappa was injured. It then became clear the point directly north of 4875 also had to be captured. Capt. Batra led the final assault on this point, rescuing Capt. Nagappa but himself succumbed to Sniper and RPG fire on 7 July. Capt Batra's attack ensured an Indian victory at point 4875.

First Ceasefire§

Between 4 and 12 July, 17 Jat and 2 Naga continued to attack peaks adjacent to Point 4875 and had success. 6 and 7 Para SF attacked point 4700 but had to suspend their operations on 12 July when the ceasefire came into effect. After the Pakistani forces failed to honour the ceasefire and withdraw forces, the Indian forces resumed operations and Point 4700 was captured by Para SF.